RECENT APPELLATE DECISIONSOn June 16, 2008, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided the case of Commonwealth v. Randy James Houck, 2008 WL 2414962. The issue in this case was whether a criminal defendant’s waiver of a jury trial can be rendered invalid when he is informed at a jury waiver colloquy of a range of sentences he could face if convicted which is shorter than the sentence he eventually receives.
In an Opinion by Justice Max Baer, joined by all the members of the Supreme Court, it was held that in order to be entitled to a remedy, the defendant must establish that he relied on the recitation of his sentence during the jury waiver proceedings in making his decision to agree to waive the right to a jury trial.
Mr. Houck was charged with Rape and related offenses in connection with a sexual assault on a young women. The defendant eventually agreed to waive his right to a jury trial and signed a written colloquy to that effect. In addition, the trial court conducted an oral jury waiver colloquy. Although the trial court explained the maximum potential sentence that the defendant faced for each offense, when the defendant, having being convicted of these offenses, was eventually sentenced by the trial court, he received an aggregate sentence (37 ½ to 75 years of imprisonment) which exceeded the range of sentences recited at the oral colloquy.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania had vacated the defendant’s judgment of sentence and remanded for resentencing with instructions that the defendant should be resentenced within the range recited at the oral jury waiver colloquy. The Commonwealth then filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal which the Supreme Court granted. The sole issue before the Court was whether the defendant’s jury trial waiver could stand where the trial court recited a range of possible sentences at the oral jury waiver colloquy that turned out to be less than the sentence the defendant actually received.
Justice Baer pointed out that a potential sentence is not one of the essential ingredients necessary for a defendant to understand the nature of the jury trial. However, the Supreme Court held that the voluntariness of a jury waiver can be undermined where the defendant is informed of a range of potential sentences at his jury waiver colloquy that is less than the sentence imposed. Nevertheless, the defendant cannot obtain relief unless he can demonstrate that his understanding of the length of the potential sentence “was a material factor in making the decision to waive a jury trial”. In that situation, the waiver of a jury trial is involuntary and cannot stand.
In Mr. Houck’s case, there was not sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant was focused on the length of his sentence when he waived his right to a jury trial. Therefore, the court reversed the Superior Court and reinstated the judgement of sentence.
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On June 19, 2008, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Indiana v. Edwards a 7 to 2 decision. Justice Breyer delivered the Opinion of the Court. Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented. ,
The issue in this case was whether the constitution forbids a State from insisting that a criminal defendant proceed to trial with counsel where a state court has found the defendant not mentally competent to conduct that trial himself, although the defendant may be mentally competent to stand trial if represented by counsel.
Under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to proceed to trial without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. However, the right of self-representation is not absolute. The court noted that in several cases, it had ruled that a defendant has no right to engage in serious and obstructionist misconduct by representing himself. The question in the Edwards case was whether a mental-illness related limitation on the scope of the self -representation right should exist.
Justice Breyer ruled that the constitution permits a State to limit a defendant’s self-representation right by insisting upon representation by counsel at trial where the defendant lacks the mental capacity to conduct his trial defense unless he is represented. The court noted that an individual may well be able to satisfy the standard for mental competence to stand trial (being able to work with counsel at trial) but yet be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel.
Accordingly, the Constitution permits a state to insist upon representation by counsel for those defendants who are competent enough to stand trial but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point that they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. Justice Breyer’s Opinion will assure trial judges the authority to deal appropriately with cases where the mental competence of the defendant who seeks to represent himself is an issue.
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On June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court of the United States decided two cases involving the interpretation of the writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S. Code §2241 with respect to the detention of individuals in connection with the ongoing war against terrorists. In Boumediene, et al v. Bush, in a 5-4 Opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that aliens who had been designated as enemy combatants and who are detained at the United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, do have the constitutional privilege of seeking a writ of habeas corpus and that the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 is not an adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus. The court stated that the Writ is “an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers”, even where, as in this case, the petitioners are not American citizens. Therefore, under the judicial power of the federal courts, a writ of habeas corpus could be issued to support a grant of relief for such a defendant, even, if necessary, an order directing his release.
Justice Kennedy noted that some of these petitioners have been custody for six years with no definitive judicial determination as to the legality of their detention. Therefore, their access to the Writ is necessary in order to have a way to determine the lawfulness of their status, “even if, in the end, they do not obtain the relief they seek”. As Justice Kennedy stated, “the laws and Constitution are designed to survive and remain in force in extraordinary times. Liberty and security can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the framework of the law. The Framers decided that habeas corpus, a right of first importance, must be a part of that framework, a part of that law”.
On the same day, Chief Justice Roberts delivered the Opinion of a unanimous court in the case of Munaf , et al v. Gueran. That case concerned the availability of habeas corpus relief for U. S. citizens individuals who had voluntarily traveled to Iraq and were alleged to have committed crimes there and have been detained by the multi-national coalition forces. The Court held that the habeas statute extends to American citizens held overseas by American forces operating subject to an American chain of command. However, these petitioners were not entitled to relief because a federal court cannot grant an order that would interfere with the sovereign right of Iraq to prosecute these men for alleged violations of the law of Iraq. The Court held that there is nothing in the habeas law which would shelter the petitioners from a sovereign government that seeks to have them answer for alleged crimes committed in that country.